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DESEGREGATING THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW
SCHOOL: VIRGIL HAWKINS V. THE FLORIDA BOARD OF
CONTROL
DARRYL PAULSON* AND PAUL HAWKES**
In April of 1949, Virgil D. Hawkins, a thirty-nine-year-old black
public relations official of Bethune-Cookman College, applied for
admission to the University of Florida College of Law. Thus began
a nine-year odyssey that would find Hawkins appearing four times
before the United States Supreme Court and a half dozen times
before Florida jurists in his attempt to become the first black ad-
mitted to the University of Florida, the state's only law school at
that time. In spite of what appeared to be a clear order from the
United States Supreme Court to admit Hawkins, he would be
stymied in his quest to attend the law school of his native state.
The actions of Florida's public officials, including the Governor,
the Attorney General, the State Board of Control, and the Florida
Supreme Court would frustrate Hawkins in his struggle to desegre-
gate higher education in the state.1
Hawkins' applidation, along with four others from black students
applying to graduate programs at the University of Florida, was
rejected on May 13, 1949, by the Florida Board of Control, the
governing body of the state university system. Believing that this
denial violated his fourteenth amendment right to "equal protec-
tion of the law," Hawkins asked the Florida Supreme Court to is-
sue a writ of mandamus ordering his admission to the University
of Florida Law School. In response to the suit, the Board of Con-
trol offered two alternative ways for Hawkins to achieve a legal
education. The first plan allowed Hawkins to attend, at state ex-
pense, a law school outside the state. The second plan called for
Hawkins to attend the newly authorized school of law at Florida A
& M College in Tallahassee. Under the second plan, Hawkins
would be allowed to attend law school at the University of Florida
* B.A. 1970, St. Cloud State College; M.A. 1971, Ph.D. 1975, Florida State University.
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg.
** Student, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee.
1. Among the various articles on Virgil Hawkins, the most useful are: J. PREER, Hawkins:
Conditions That Now Prevail, in LAWYERS V. EDUCATORS 127 (1982); Bennett, The South's
Most Patient Man, EBONY, Oct. 1958, at 89; Brazeal, Some Problems in the Desegregation
of Higher Education in the "Hard Core" States, 27 J. NEGRO EDuc. 352 (Summer 1958);
Porter, The Status of Educational Desegregation in Florida, 25 J. NEGRO EDUc. 246 (Sum-
mer 1956); Selkow, Hawkins, The United States Supreme Court and Justice, 31 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 97 (Winter 1962); Tomberlin, The Negro and Florida's System of Education: The
Aftermath of the Brown Case (Aug. 1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University).
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"until such time as adequate and comparable facilities and person-
nel" could be established at Florida A & M to satisfy the equal
protection requirements.2
The first alternative was rejected by Hawkins, his NAACP attor-
neys, and the Florida Supreme Court. Hawkins personally ex-
pressed his objections about the possibility of having to leave his
home state to receive a legal education. As a state taxpayer, Haw-
kins felt entitled to state privileges. "The white boys with whom I
had played didn't have to go off," noted Hawkins, and "had I gone
off to law school the nearest one would have been Howard Univer-
sity in Washington, D.C." The Florida Supreme Court was also
fully aware of the fact that the United States Supreme Court had
voided such a proposal in 1938 in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Ca-
nada.' Missouri had required Negro law school applicants to ob-
tain their education in adjacent states. The Supreme Court of the
United States rejected this scheme, holding that once Missouri de-
cided to support higher education for whites, it had the same obli-
gation to blacks. In a six-two decision, the Court ordered Gaines'
admission, stating that "the State was bound to furnish him within
its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those
which the State there afforded for persons of the white race. ... 5
Although Hawkins and his attorneys rejected the second alterna-
tive of the Board of Control, attending the newly created Florida A
& M College of Law, the Florida Supreme Court found the plan
acceptable. "In our view," stated the unanimous court, "this alter-
native plan presented by the respondents in their answer satisfies
all the requirements of the equal protection of the laws clause of
the Federal Constitution."' The most important element of the
case, according to the Florida Supreme Court, was the issue of
state sovereignty. As the court noted in upholding the Board of
Control's second alternative,
No court in the land has ever required of a sovereign state any
more than is encompassed within the plan proposed by the Board
of Control in its answer. Every individual political right and privi-
lege guaranteed the citizen by the provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution is maintained under the program, while at the same time
2. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So. 2d 608, 611 (Fla. 1950).
3. Brazeal, supra note 1, at 356.
4. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
5. Id. at 351.
6. Hawkins, 47 So. 2d at 613.
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the right of the State to adopt such method as it finds best
designed to afford substantially equal educational opportunities
to Florida citizens of different race groups has been preserved. 7
In accepting the Board's second alternative, however, the Florida
court seemed to be conveniently ignoring a series of United States
Supreme Court decisions. These cases held that such "overnight"
law schools and graduate schools were so deficient in terms of cur-
riculum, facilities, faculties and a host of other intangible factors
that they could not afford black students an equal educational
opportunity. 8
Ten months later, Virgil Hawkins was again before the Florida
Supreme Court, asking them to order his admission to the Univer-
sity of Florida. Hawkins' complaint stated that he had exhausted
all reasonable means to obtain admission to the only tax-supported
law school in the state. He further claimed that "the creation of
the purported school of law" for Negroes at Florida A & M failed
to provide him with the equal protection of the law." Once again,
the state's highest tribunal rejected this view. According to the
court, all Hawkins had to do was make a "timely" application to
Florida A & M and a law school for blacks would begin operating.
The court also denied a request to dismiss its jurisdiction over the
case so that Hawkins might appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.
On August 1, 1952, Hawkins made his third appearance before
the Florida Supreme Court. Hawkins' attorneys again requested
his admittance to the University of Florida and, failing that, asked
that the court dismiss the case. The court pointed out that the law
school at Florida A & M which Hawkins had previously referred to
as the "purported law school" no longer existed merely on paper
but now had "classrooms, a law library, a law faculty, and appro-
priations of public moneys which appear to be sufficient ade-
quately to maintain the law school."' 10 The court also judicially no-
ticed the "fact" that the Florida A & M Law School "offered law
courses similar in content and quality to those offered at the Col-
7. Id. at 614.
8. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
9. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 53 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1951).
10. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 60 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1952). The Florida
A & M Law School opened in September of 1951 with five students, four faculty members
and a library of 16,000 volumes. FLORIDA BOARD OF CONTROL, BIENNAL REPORT (1950-1952).
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lege of Law of the University of Florida."'1 Nevertheless, as Haw-
kins was adamant in his desire to attend the law school at the Uni-
versity of Florida, the court agreed that there was nothing more
that it could do and so dismissed the case.
Hawkins and his attorneys immediately filed an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. Unlike the result in 1951, when the
Court refused to hear the case because the state court still retained
jurisdiction, this time certiorari was granted. Unfortunately for
Hawkins, his case would be put on hold until the Court disposed of
the Brown v. Board of Education2 case on May 17, 1954. In that
landmark decision, a unanimous Court struck down the "separate
but equal" doctrine and declared that "separate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal." '13 One week after the Brown decision,
the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision on the Hawkins
case. In its ruling, the Court vacated the judgment of the lower
court and remanded the case "in light of the Segregation Cases
decided May 17, 1954 . . .and conditions that now prevail.'
' 4
At last, victory appeared to be within the grasp of Virgil Haw-
kins. Any celebration, however, would have to be postponed. The
Florida Supreme Court had a far different perception of "condi-
tions that now prevail" than did the nation's highest court. The
Florida Supreme Court postponed any action on the Hawkins case
until the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its
Brown 1115 ruling, which would indicate how the Court intended its
desegregation decree to be implemented. In Brown II, the United
States Supreme Court gave local officials the primary responsibil-
ity to make "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compli-
ance," but these officials were allowed to take into consideration
local conditions in fashioning their desegregation policy.' 6 The ma-
jority of the Florida justices interpreted Brown II as giving trial
judges the authority to determine "the precise time in any given
jurisdiction when members of the Negro race shall be admitted to
white schools. '1 7 This novel interpretation of Brown II became the
rationale for spurning Hawkins' request for a writ of mandamus.
11. Hawkins, 60 So. 2d at 164.
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Id. at 495. For a masterful account of the history of this landmark case, see R.
KLUGER, SIMPLa JUSTiCE (1976).
14. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
16. Id. at 300.
17. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 24 (1955).
HAWKINS v. BOARD OF CONTROL
The justices then agreed with the Board of Control's position that
the admission of Virgil Hawkins to the University of Florida would
present "grave and serious problems affecting the welfare of all
students. '"18 The court appointed Circuit Judge John A. H. Mur-
phree to be a commissioner of the court. Murphree was instructed
to take testimony which would be used to determine "the time
when the relator should be admitted to the University of Florida
Law School."'19
Justice Terrell wrote a concurring opinion that must rank as one
of the most unsound legal decisions in the court's history. Terrell
argued that southern states had spent "billions of dollars" creating
a "separate but equal" school system and, therefore, desegregation
should be delayed "until the schools provided in reliance on the
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson have ceased to be adequate."' 0 Jus-
tice Terrell then noted that segregation
is and has always been the unvarying law of the animal kingdom.
The dove and the quail, the turkey and the turkey buzzard, the
chicken and the guinea, it matters not where they are found, are
segregated .... [W]hen God created man, he allotted each race
to his own continent according to color, Europe to the white man,
Asia to the yellow man, Africa to the black man, and America to
the red man, but we are now advised that God's plan was in error
and must be reversed. ... 21
An editorial cartoon in the St. Petersburg Times lambasted Ter-
rell's faulty logic. The cartoon showed an American Indian con-
fronting Terrell and telling him to "Scram, paleface!""
For the first time, two of the Florida justices dissented from
their colleagues. Justices Sebring and Thomas noted that
"whatever may be our personal views and desires in respect to the
matter, we have the binding obligation imposed by our oath of of-
fice, to apply to the issue at hand the Federal Constitution, as
presently interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United
States. . ". ." Although they realized that certain "adjustments"
would have to be made before admitting Hawkins, they did not
believe that "these adjustments will be of such a major nature that
18. Id.
19. Id. at 25.
20. Id. at 26-27 (Terrell, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 27-28.
22. St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 21, 1955, at A6, col. 3.
23. Hawkins, 83 So. 2d at 31 (Sebring, J., concurring and dissenting).
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the constitutional right of the relator to attend the school of his
choice should be denied at this time . . 4
In the face of the Florida Supreme Court's continued judicial
defiance, Virgil Hawkins once again took his case to the nation's
highest court. In a brief, but pointed, per curiam opinion, the Su-
preme Court attempted to distinguish desegregation in higher edu-
cation from that in elementary and secondary schools. "[O]ur sec-
ond decision in the Brown case . . . had no application to a case
involving a Negro applying for admission to a state law school."
The jurists then ordered, "As this case involves the admission of a
Negro to a graduate professional school, there is no reason for de-
lay. He is entitled to prompt admission under the rules and regula-
tions applicable to other qualified candidates. 25
After seven years of Florida's judicial delay, the March 12, 1956,
decision of the United States Supreme Court appeared to put an
end to Virgil Hawkins' battle. A front page story in the New York
Times was headlined, "Court Bars Delay in Granting Negro Law
School Seat," while the Tampa Tribune headline read, "High
Court Orders Florida U. to Admit Negro Law Student." Unfortu-
nately, the decision of the Supreme Court would not only trigger
further judicial obstructionism, but also made the Hawkins case a
pivotal political issue in the 1956 gubernatorial election.
Gilbert L. Porter, in a 1956 article in the Journal of Negro Edu-
cation, contended that the Hawkins case helped push Florida from
moderation to massive resistance on the race issue. 6 The day after
the Supreme Court's decision, the Tallahassee Democrat editorial-
ized that the Court had "allowed desegregation extremists to force
from it a decision on admission of a Negro to the University of
Florida right now at the height of a political campaign and with
emotions running high. '27 Governor LeRoy Collins, widely praised
as a force of moderation in southern race relations, immediately
announced his opposition to the decision and said he would per-
sonally attempt to argue Florida's case before the Supreme
Court." In a statewide radio broadcast on the same day the Court
24. Id. at 33.
25. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956) (citations
omitted).
26. Porter, supra note 1, at 252.
27. Tallahassee Democrat, Mar. 13, 1956, at A6, col. 1.
28. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 13, 1956, at Al, col. 3. The major works praising Gover-
nor Collins as a force of modernation include: E. BLACK, SOUTHERN GOVERNORS AND CIVIL
RIGHTS (1976); D. COLBURN & R. SCHER, FLORIDA'S GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS IN THE TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY (1980); Wagy, A South to Save: The Administration of Governor LeRoy Col-
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rendered its verdict, Governor Collins vowed that Florida was "just
as determined as any Southern state to maintain segregation, but
we will do so by lawful and peaceful means."29
At Collins' suggestion, the state cabinet met and pledged to re-
sist the Court's order and agreed to call a conference to devise
strategies to resist desegregation. That conference was held on
March 21, 1956 in Tallahassee and participants included the gover-
nor and the cabinet, the Board of Control, all university presi-
dents, and several legislators and educators. The conferees adopted
four motions. First, they agreed to petition the Supreme Court to
rehear the Hawkins case. Second, they voted to adopt new regula-
tions for admission to state universities. Third, they agreed to ap-
point a commission to study desegregation remedies. Finally, they
urged Governor Collins to ask President Eisenhower to call a meet-
ing of Southern governors to discuss desegregation."0
The two primary challengers to Governor Collins in the 1956
governor's race were Democrats, Senator Sumter Lowry of Tampa
and former governor Fuller Warren of Miami. Lowry, a retired Na-
tional Guard lieutenant general, took the most extreme position on
the segregation issue. According to Lowry, desegregation was a plot
designed to destroy the white race by mixing it with the blood of
the Negro race. Lowry attacked Collins' inaction in the Hawkins
case, saying that Collins' request to appear before the Supreme
Court was "too little and too late."31 Invoking the doctrine of in-
terposition, Lowry urged the state to interpose "the sovereign
power of the State of Florida to prevent race mixing here."'
Fuller Warren, govern-r from 1949 to 1953, was Collins' main
electoral foe. Warren tried to capitalize on the Hawkins case by
urging the Board of Control to reject Hawkins' application to law
school. In a telegram to the Board, Warren accused Hawkins of
having beaten two children while employed as a teacher in Lake
County, Florida, in the 1940's. Warren described the alleged beat-
lins of Florida (June 1980) (Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University).
29. LeRoy Collins, Radio and Television Campaign Speech (Mar. 12, 1956) (available in
Box 1 of the LeRoy Collins Papers in the library of the University of South Florida, Tampa)
[hereinafter cited as Collins Papers). Miami Herald columnist Jack Bell wrote that he was
"surprised and disappointed" by Collins' refusal to "show courage" with respect to the Haw-
kins case. Sept. 30, 1956, at 4G, col. 1. In a personal letter responding to Bell's column,
Collins argued that his refusal to resist Hawkins' admission "would have had disastrous
consequences" because of the "explosive atmosphere" in the state. Collins Papers, Box 1.
30. Tomberlin, supra note 1, at 162.
31. Tallahassee Democrat, Mar. 13, 1956, at 1, col. 5.
32. St. Petersburg Times, Apr. 4, 1956, at 12, col. 3.
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ings as "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Consti-
tution and, as such, grounds for rejecting Hawkins' request for ad-
mission to the University of Florida.3 3 The efforts of Collins,
Lowry, and Warren in trying to emerge in the eyes of the electo-
rate as the leading defender of segregation led Frank Trippett of
the St. Petersburg Times to describe the 1956 gubernatorial cam-
paign as "rolling along like a segregation surrey with a lunatic
fringe on top."3
Two important reports were issued on the Hawkins case in May
of 1956. The first report was filed by Commissioner Murphree, who
had been appointed by the Florida Supreme Court to gather evi-
dence concerning the impact of Hawkins' admission to law school.
Hawkins and his attorneys refused to participate in the hearings, a
sign that was duly noted by Murphree to indicate that it was not
the right time to admit Hawkins. After hearing testimony from
state officials and educators, Murphree concluded that Hawkins'
enrollment "may have the potential of causing serious public dis-
cord and disturbances in the state."3
That same month, the Board of Control issued its Study on De-
segregation. In this report, the Board concluded that better than
ninety percent of the Negroes would be in difficulty academically
when they came to the white institutions. Based on 57,322 ques-
tionnaires sent out by the Board, the report stated that the main
fear expressed was that of intermarriage between the white and
Negro races. In addition, the Board expressed fear of declining rev-
enue in cafeterias and a decline in alumni contributions because of
integration. 6
Armed with these new reports, in March of 1957 the Florida Su-
preme Court would stifle for a fifth time the attempt of Virgil
Hawkins to enter the law school at the University of Florida. Chief
Justice Roberts first rejected the 1956 ruling of the United States
Supreme Court which stated there was "no reason for delay" in the
Hawkins case. Roberts and four of his colleagues noted several rea-
33. Two former school officials from Lake County denied that the incident ever oc-
curred. On March 29, 1956, Governor Warren released four affidavits which he said substan-
tiated his case. The affair ended when Attorney General Ervin informed Warren that his
charges against Hawkins did not affect the question of admission to the University of Flor-
ida. See Tomberlin, supra note 1, at 122-24.
34. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 25, 1956, at 1, col. 1.
35. Hearing Conducted by Commissioner John A. H. Murphree at the Request of the
Florida Supreme Court (May 21, 1956). Transcripts of the hearing are contained in the
Collins Papers, supra note 29, in Box 139, File "Race Relations, 1955-1958."
36. FLORIDA BOARD OF CONTROL, STUDY ON DESEGREGATION (1956).
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sons why delay was justified. For the most part, they merely sum-
marized the reports of Commissioner Murphree and the Board of
Control. Justice Roberts, in a lengthy plea in support of state sov-
ereignty, argued that despite recent infringements on states' rights:
[W]e cannot attribute to the Supreme Court an intention to abro-
gate the rule which denies to federal courts the right to regulate
or control long-established rules of practice and procedure
adopted by state courts for the administration of justice
therein. . . . [W]e cannot assume that the Supreme Court in-
tended to deprive the highest court of an independent sovereign
state of one of its traditional powers, that is, the right to exercise
a sound judicial discretion as to the date of the issuance of its
process in order to prevent a serious public mischief.37
The high court denied without prejudice the request for a writ of
mandamus until such time as Hawkins could shbw that "his ad-
mission can be accomplished without doing great public mis-
chief."s In reality, the court had thrust an impossible burden of
proof upon Hawkins.
As had occurred in the Florida court's 1955 decision, two justices
dissented. Justices Thomas and Drew agreed that "the time has
arrived to obey the mandate of the higher court. . . regardless of
our lack of sympathy with the holding. ' '3 ' After describing in detail
the history of Hawkins' court battles, Justice Thomas concluded,
"It seems to me that if this court expects obedience to its man-
dates, it must be prepared immediately to obey mandates from a
higher court."40 Finally, Justice Drew cited the often quoted axiom
37. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 93 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1957).
38. Id. at 360. In a concurring opinion, Justice Terrell bitterly attacked the United
States Supreme Court's recent holdings with respect to the right of states to determine their
own education systems:
Some anthropologists and historians much better informed than I am point out
that segregation is as old as the hills. The Egyptians practiced it on the Israelites;
the Greeks did likewise for the barbarians; the Romans segregated the Syrians;
the Chinese segregated all foreigners; segregation is said to have produced the
caste system in India and Hitler practiced it in his Germany, but no one ever
discovered that it was in violation of due process until recently and to do so some
of the same historians point out that the Supreme Court abandoned the Constitu-
tion, precedent and common sense and fortified its decision solely with the writ-
ings of Gunner Myrdal, a Scandinavian sociologist. What he knew about constitu-
tional law we are not told nor have we been able to learn.
Id. at 360-61 (Terrell, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 367 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. This position was supported by United States Senator Jacob Javits
(Repub.-N.Y.), who cited the Hawkins case as a "striking example" of interposition. Sena-
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of law that "justice delayed is justice denied."4
The Tampa Tribune praised the "basically sound" reasoning of
the court in an editorial the day after the court's decision. "Are not
Florida authorities better qualified to know the difficulties in-
volved," argued the Tribune, "than are the nine men sitting in
splendid isolation in Washington? '42 Richard Ervin, Florida's At-
torney General and Hawkins' opponent throughout the long
ordeal, described the decision as "very fine." 3 The NAACP attor-
ney for Hawkins, Horace E. Hill, not only complained about the
legal reasoning of the decision but also questioned its philosophical
implications. "Florida and its people," observed Hill, "have not
progressed far enough toward the idea of Christian morality and
brotherhood. 4 4
On October 15, 1957, the Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari to Virgil Hawkins, "without prejudice to the peti-
tioner's seeking relief in an appropriate United States District
Court. ' 45 Hawkins followed the Supreme Court's advice, but on
January 29, 1958, Federal District Judge Dozier DeVane refused to
issue a preliminary injunction against university officials. Judge
DeVane refused to permit Hawkins to present evidence at the
hearing, an error that was noted by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in reversing Judge DeVane's opinion."'
On May 16, 1958, the Board of Control placed another obstacle
in the path of Virgil Hawkins. The Board adopted a regulation
barring anyone from the University of Florida Law School who had
scored less than 250 on the admissions test in the past or 350 in
the future.47 Hawkins had scored only 200 when he had taken the
examination in August 1956. When Hawkins originally applied to
the University in 1949, it had no minimum test score requirement.
In fact, the Florida court noted in its 1950 decision that Hawkins
possessed "all the scholastic, moral and other qualifications, except
tor Javits encouraged an audience of New York University Law Alumni to take a firm stand
"in favor of the Federal Constitution as the paramount law of the land and against the
doctrine of interposition." New York Times, Mar. 12, 1957, at 6, col. 3.
41. Hawkins, 93 So. 2d at 367 (Drew, J., dissenting).
42. Tampa Tribune, Mar. 9, 1957, at 8, col. 1.
43. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 9, 1957, at 1, col. 1.
44. Id. Hawkins' first attorney was Alex Ackerman, a white Orlando lawyer active in
Republican party politics. Hill, a black attorney from Daytona Beach, was assisted by sev-
eral lawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, including its chief coun-
sel, Thurgood Marshall.
45. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 355 U.S. 839 (1957).
46. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 253 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1958).
47. New York Times, May 17, 1958, at L39, col. 6.
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as to race and color. 4 a Now the state of Florida had changed the
rules of the game in its attempt to deny Virgil Hawkins a place in
law school.
Appearing once again before Judge DeVane, the state contended
that Hawkins was not "scholastically or morally fit" to attend the
University of Florida. In addition to noting Hawkins' admission
test score, Florida officials contended that Hawkins had written a
bad check, defaulted on an auto loan, and had beaten two children
while teaching school. DeVane was not convinced by the state's ar-
gument, and asked Hawkins if he was ready to make a new appli-
cation, or if he would continue to seek admission based on his 1949
application. Hawkins opted for the first approach. According to Sa-
muel Selkow, Hawkins decided on this option because if he
relied on his 1949 application, there might have been a long trial
on his qualifications. During such a long trial other qualified Ne-
groes would have had to wait for the Federal Court's decision on
the race issue .... By agreeing to present a new application,
Hawkins removed the issue of his own qualifications from the
case and allowed the Federal Court to go directly to the race
issue.49
On June 18, 1958, Judge DeVane issued an injunction prohibiting
the University of Florida from limiting admission to its graduate
programs to white persons only. 0
Although Hawkins applied for admission to the University of
Florida for the Fall 1958 term, he changed his mind and decided to
pursue his graduate education elsewhere. Hawkins told the Pitts-
burgh Courier that he ended his nine-year battle because he was
tired and broke, and because his wife had asked him not to con-
tinue the fight.5 Hawkins also expressed his resentment over the
delaying tactics of the Florida government. "When I started this I
was 39 years old," exclaimed Hawkins. "After ten years of delaying
tactics, they talk about gradualism and patience! How gradual can
48. Hawkins, 47 So. 2d at 609.
49. Selkow, supra note 1, at 100 (footnote omitted).
50. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 162 F. Supp. 851, 853 (N.D. Fla. 1958).
51. Pittsburgh Courier, Nov. 7, 1959. In an interview with the authors on December 10,
1982, Mr. Hawkins confirmed that the primary reason for ending his legal battle was the
request of his wife. In September of 1958 the University of Florida Law School admitted its
first black student, George Starke of Orlando, without incident. Tomberlin, supra note 1, at
190.
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we be? I wish I were nine years younger." '52
In September of 1959, Virgil Hawkins enrolled at Boston Uni-
versity and earned a master's degree in public relations. From 1961
until 1965, Hawkins attended the New England School of Law in
Boston where he would finally earn his law degree at the age of
fifty-eight.5- Unfortunately, the New England Law School was not
accredited until four years after Hawkins graduated, and the Flor-
ida Bar demands that its lawyers attend accredited institutions. If
Hawkins had been admitted to the University of Florida when he
had originally applied, he would have qualified for "diploma privi-
leges" which would have earned him admission to the Florida Bar
without a bar examination. In 1974, the Florida Supreme Court
voted to admit Benjamin Ervin, brother of former Florida Attor-
ney General Richard Ervin, to the Florida Bar even though he had
failed the Bar examination four times. The court ruled that Ervin
had originally enrolled in law school when diploma privileges were
in effect and, thus, he was not required to pass the Bar examina-
tion." Two years later, Hawkins would appeal to the Florida Su-
preme Court to admit him directly to the Florida Bar without hav-
ing to pass the Bar exam. Hawkins cited the Ervin precedent. On
November 13, 1976, at the age of seventy, a unanimous supreme
court admitted Virgil Hawkins to the Florida Bar without his hav-
ing to take the Bar examination.5 In its opinion, the court noted
that Hawkins had a "claim on this court's conscience. '56 After over
a quarter of a century in struggle, Virgil Hawkins, "the South's
most patient man," was finally a lawyer.5
52. Brazeal, supra note 1, at 358.
53. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 21, 1976, § "The Floridian," at 22, col. 1.
54. In re Ervin, 290 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
55. In re Hawkins, 339 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1976).
56. Id. at 638. Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision on admitting Hawkins to
the Bar, Richard Ervin, the Florida Attorney General who had so vigorously defended Flor-
ida's policy of segregation in the various Hawkins trials, would urge the high court to admit
Hawkins. Ervin told the St. Petersburg Times that "I thought I had the duty at the time to
oppose his admission to the University of Florida. However, in retrospect, I'm sorry about
the whole episode." Mar. 21, 1976, § "The Floridian," at 22, col. 1.
57. Two issues surrounding Virgil Hawkins emerged in the spring of 1983. Over 100 law
students at Florida State University signed a petition urging the state legislature to name
the school's new law library after Hawkins. The proposal was sponsored by State Senator
Carrie Meek (Dem.-Miami), but was not acted on by the legislature. St. Petersburg Times,
Apr. 19, 1983, at 9B, col. 3. The legislature did establish ten law fellowships at both the
University of Florida and Florida State University in Hawkins' name. Ch. 83-300, 1983 Fla.
Laws 1635.
In a second development, proceedings were initiated to discipline Hawkins for alleged
"inadequate and incompetent" handling of a client's case. Hawkins was accused of failing to
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tell his client of a plea bargain offer, failing to interview prosecution witnesses, and encour-
aging a defense witness to misrepresent her identity. A legal referee who heard the charges
against Hawkins stated: "I do not believe that any of his [Hawkins') actions were under-
taken with intent to deceive the court but resulted from a lack of experience." The referee
recommended that Hawkins be publicly reprimanded and be placed on probation for two
years. After consultation with counsel, Hawkins agreed to these sanctions. The Board of
Governors of the Florida Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to overturn the referee's
recommended disciplinary measures and to instead suspend Hawkins for three months and
not allow him to resume his practice until he provided proof of rehabilitation. Florida Bar v.
Hawkins, 9 Fla. L.W. 42 (Feb. 3, 1984).
In an impassioned plea before the Florida Supreme Court on November 9, 1983, Hawkins
stated:
On the 28th of this month, I'll be 77 years old and all of us know that at age 77,
the sand in the hourglass of time is swiftly running out. I would hate very much to
be suspended on a little thing and leave here not a member of the Florida Bar.
St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 10, 1983, at 3B, col. 1.
Once again, the fate of Virgil Hawkins was pending before the Florida Supreme Court.
The court held that, based on the referee's findings of fact, "we find no justification for the
imposition of the punishment requested by the Board of Governors." Hawkins was therefore
not suspended but was instead reprimanded and placed on probation. 9 Fla. L.W. at 42.

